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The long and unwieldy title of this essay reflects the complex range of
issues implicated in any project designed to promote the effective
participation of labor/community coalitions in the process of progressive
social transformation. The decision of the University of Pennsylvania
Journal of Labor and Employment Law to organize a unique gathering of
community leaders, activists, labor organizers, law professors, and social
scientists provided a particularly valuable opportunity to advance this
project because it focused attention on two specific case studies in which
effective labor/community coalitions were indispensable to the success of
union organizing and collective bargaining efforts.1 The Greensboro case
study recounts the struggles waged by warehouse workers and community
leaders to combat the abusive employment practices of a Kmart distribution
center in Greensboro, North Carolina, while the New Haven case study
recounts a series of labor/community struggles over the anti-union practices
of Yale University and of the OMNI at Yale.2
My purpose in this essay is to contextualize these two case studies in a
t Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Center for Hispanic
and Caribbean Legal Studies, University of Miami Law School.
1. See Symposium, Activism and the Law: The Intersection of the Labor and Civil
Rights Movement, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 617, 617-806 (2000). Professor Susan Sturm
did a wonderful job of structuring a group process that enabled genuine substantive
exchange among a wide variety of participants and perspectives.
2. See Dorian T. Warren & Cathy J. Cohen, Labor/Civil Rights Coalitions: A Case
Study of New Haven, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 629 (2000); Penda D. Hair, Prayer and
Protest in Greensboro, North Carolina: Bringing Community Visions of Justice to Kmart's
Treatment of its Workers, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 657 (2000).
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way that reflects some of the basic theoretical and political advances that
currently are converging in the LatCrit movement.3 Rather than forward a
general or abstract description of LatCrit theory and its social justice
agendas, my purpose is to suggest specific points of convergence between
LatCrit theory and the effort to promote more effective labor/community
coalitions by focusing specifically on the lessons these two case studies
offer when examined through a LatCrit perspective.
Like any complex socio-legal phenomenon, the events described in
the Greensboro and New Haven case studies are subject to conflicting
interpretations. Since its inception, LatCrit theory has sought to engage
such interpretative conflicts in a way that prioritizes the pursuit of inter-
group justice. This priority placed on inter-group justice is reflected in the
substantial efforts made by LatCrit scholars to articulate a common context
of struggle across the variety of inter-group differences,' to reveal the
particularities of perspective and position reflected in the construction of
3. LatCrit scholarship, which is devoted to Latina and Latino Critical Legal Theory,
has virtually exploded in the last four years. In addition to the published proceedings of
LatCrit I, II, and II, LatCrit scholars have also produced a first-ever Symposium exploring
key issues in international law and international human rights from a critical race
perspective. See Symposium, LatCrit Theory: Naming and Launching a New Discourse of
Critical Legal Scholarship, 2 HARV. LATiNO L. REV. 1 (1997) (LatCrit 1); Symposium,
Difference, Solidarity and Law: Building Latinalo Communities Through LatCrit Theory, 19
CicANo-LATINo L. REv. 1 (1998) (LatCrit II); Symposium, Comparative Latinas/os:
Identity, Law and Policy in LatCrit Theory, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 575 (1999) (LatCrit m11);
Symposium, International Law, Human Rights and LatCrit Theory, 28 U. MIAMI ITER-AM.
L. REv. 177 (1997). LatCrit scholarship has also been published in a stand-alone volume.
See Symposium, LatCrit Theory, Latinas/os and the Law, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1087 (1997), 10
LA RAZA L.J. 1 (1998). For proceedings of the gathering of Latina/o Law Professors that
gave birth to the LatCrit project, see Colloquium, Representing Latinalo Communities:
Critical Race Theory and Practice, 9 LA RAZA L. J. 1 (1996). For a particularly insightful
overview of the purposes and commitments of the LatCrit movement see Francisco Valdes,
Under Construction: LatCrit Consciousness, Community and Theory, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1087,
1093-96 (1997), 10 LA RAZA L.L 1, 7-10 (1998) [hereinafter Under Construction]. For
proceedings of the LatCrit IV conference see Symposium, Rotating Centers, Expanding
Frontiers: LatCrit Theory and Marginal Intersections, 33 U.C. DAvis L. REv. (forthcoming
Spring 2000).
4. See Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Out of the Shadow: Marking Intersections in and
Between Asian Pacific American Critical Legal Scholarship and Latinalo Critical Theory,
40 B.C. L. REv. 349, 352-53; 19 B.C. THInD WORLD L.J. 349 (1998) [hereinafter Out of the
Shadow] (articulating common context of struggle for Latinas/os and Asian Pacific
Americans around three points of reference: (1) the centrality of international relations; (2)
national security ideology; and (3) inter/national political economy on the re/production of
inter and intra-group subordination among Latinas/os and APAs); George A. Martinez,
African Americans, Latinos, and the Construction of Race: Toward an Epistemic Coalition,
19 CHICANO-LATINO L. REv. 213, 214 (1998) (urging Latinas/os to explore commonalities
with African Americans); Ediberto Roman, Common Ground: Perspectives on Latina-
Latino Diversity, 2 HARv. LATINO L. REV. 483, 483-84 (urging Latinas/os to focus on our
similarities rather than our differences as a way of promoting intragroup justice and pan-
ethnic solidarity).
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individual and collective interests,5 and to subject these particularities to an
anti-essentialist critique that is increasingly demanding and all-
encompassing in its commitment to revealing and eradicating all forms of
subordination within and between the various overlapping communities we
inhabit.
6
In this vein, the title of this essay provides a launching point for the
articulation of the three themes that are of central importance in engaging
the issues raised by the New Haven and Greensboro case studies from a
LatCrit perspective. First, in the title of this article, I place "community" in
quotation marks to emphasize that the meaning of "community" is not a
stable, given referent. On the contrary, it is highly contested and reflects
the many competing agendas both in the struggle to promote more effective
labor/community coalitions and in the more general LatCrit struggle to
articulate and effectuate a vision of human interconnection that can
effectively transcend the essentialist assumptions and transform the
inherited forms of identity politics that are simultaneously embedded in,
and activated by, such modem categories as race, class, gender, and
nation.
7
In the words of Reverend Nelson Johnson, a leading figure in the
efforts to marshal community support for the Kmart workers in
Greensboro, the workers' struggle was a God-sent gift because it "stirred a
stumbling, bumbling people just enough to stand up and try to discover
what it means to be human, what it means to call a community into being a
community."8 The meaning of "community" embedded in this observation
5. See Kevin R. Johnson, Some Thoughts on the Future of Latino Legal Scholarship 2
HARV. LATINO L. REV. 101 (1997) [hereinafter Latino Legal Scholarship] (exploring the
possibilities and problems confronting projects to promote Latina/o pan-ethnic solidarity);
Athena Mutua, Shifting Bottoms and Rotating Centers: Reflections on LatCrit III and the
Black/White Paradigm, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1177 (1999); Dorothy E. Roberts, BlackCrit
Theory and the Problem of Essentialism, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 855 (1999); Eric K.
Yamamoto, Conflict and Complicity: Justice Among Communities of Color, 2 HARV.
LATiNO L. REv. 495 (1997) (urging more expansive inter-racial alliances based on mutual
and reciprocal commitments to intergroup justice).
6. See Francisco Valdes, Afterword: Theorizing "OutCrit" Theories: Coalitional
Method and Comparative Jurisprudential Experience RaceCrits, QueerCrits and LatCrits,
53 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1265 (1999).
7. See Out of the Shadow, supra note 4, at 352-53 (linling the construction of
"dynamic and authentic community" both to the articulation of inter-group commonalities as
well as to the respectful embrace of inter-group differences); Elizabeth M. Iglesias,
Foreword: Democracy, Identity, Communicative Power, Inter/National Labor Rights and
the Evolution of LatCrit Theory and Community, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 575, 576-81 (1999)
[hereinafter Foreword: LatCrit III] (noting many challenges confronting LatCrit efforts to
envision and construct a genuine community based on shared commitment to an anti-
essentialist vision of anti-subordination politics and to relentless pursuit of inter and intra-
group justice).
8. Hair, supra note 2, at 657 (emphasis added); see also Nelson Johnson, Reflections
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may be intuitively obvious to some, but impenetrable to others. This is
precisely because Reverend Johnson's reference to "community" in this
context implies a conscious acknowledgment of human interconnection and
a generous and genuine embrace of the mutual obligations that this
interconnection implies. This vision of community cannot help but to
profoundly challenge the dominant economic, political, and cultural
processes that have long been restructuring the experiences of
"communities" throughout this country and beyond. From the ghost towns
of the abandoned rust-belt, through a geography of nowhere, to the empty
meeting grounds constructed precisely to incite the superficial encounters
that increasingly define the daily lives of the ever more self-centered
subjects produced by, and for, anarcho-capitalism, 9 the struggle for
"community" in the United States has been an uphill battle against the
material interests, cultural ideologies, and structures of economic and
political power that are deeply invested in transforming human
communities into "built environments.' °
As built environments, communities operate as profit-maximizing
centers for the production and accumulation of capital by some classes, at
the expense of others. Rather than promoting human flourishing and
solidarity, a community reduced to its built environment becomes the site
for complex and shifting inter- and intra-class conflicts among various
factions of labor and capital." Against the backdrop of this acquisitive
on an Attempt to Build "Authentic Community" in the Greensboro Kmart Labor Struggle, 2
U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 675 (2000).
9. See, e.g., JAMES HOwARD KUNSTLER, THE GEOGRAPHY OF NOWHERE: THE RISE AND
DECLINE OF AMERICA'S MAN-MADE LANDSCAPE (1993); DEAN MACCANNELL, EMPTY
MEETING GROUNDS: THE TOURIST PAPERS (1992).
10. See David Harvey, Labour, Capital and Class Struggle Around the Built
Environment in Advanced Capitalist Societies, in CLASSES, POWER, AND CONFLICT:
CLASSICAL AND CONTEMPORARY DEBATES 545-61 (Anthony Giddens & David Held eds.,
1982) (illustrating how the concept of "the built environment" enables a critical analysis of
the inter-class conflicts that are structured around the development of inhabited physical
space).
11. See id. In this important article, David Harvey performs a class analysis of the
competing interests at stake in the struggle to control and appropriate the surplus values
produced through the construction and commodification of the built environment. To this
end, his article maps how the struggle over the built environment structures the dynamics of
intra-class conflict between home-owning factions of labor and their propertyless
counterparts, see id. at 550-52, and between landlords, mortgage financiers and construction
companies, see id at 547-50, as well as the dynamics of inter-class conflict between labor
and capital, see id. at 556-61. This analysis is tremendously significant not only because it
reveals the materialist interests at stake in any "community development" project, but also
because it reveals why labor and community groups are always potentially in conflict, both
with each other and within their own respective organizations. This intra and inter-group
conflict results from the way differential access to the surplus values of the built
environment tends to produce internal stratifications of privilege and dispossession, both
among workers and throughout the broader community. Though a fuller articulation of
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selfishness, Reverend Johnson's suggestion that the Kmart workers'
struggle for economic and racial justice should be interpreted as a God-sent
call to action is a profoundly disruptive idea. Even more, to proactively
urge the otherwise demobilized, disaggregated, and defeated people of
Greensboro to take concerted action, to provide each other with mutual
support, and thereby to become "a community" is to take a step that directly
repudiates, and positions its proponent against, the awesome power wielded
by those forces that have worked so hard to reduce the practice of
"community development" to a profit-maximizing enterprise dictated by
the imperatives of anarcho-capitalism and possessive individualism.
Viewed in this light, the challenge presented by any project to
promote cooperative labor/community coalitions is ultimately a challenge
to manifest a different consciousness of the meaning of "community."
What is needed is a consciousness that grounds the meaning of community
in the practice of inter-group justice and grounds the practice of inter-group
justice in a recognition and affirmative embrace of the many
interconnections linking the various groups into which our identities and
communities have too often been fragmented. 2
From this perspective, the events recounted in the Greensboro and
New Haven case studies suggest important points of intersection and
convergence between LatCrit theory and the struggle to promote more
effective labor/community coalitions. This is so because the collective
production of new understandings of the meaning of "community" has been
a central concern in the evolution of LatCrit theory. LatCrit theory seeks to
articulate a broad and inclusive vision of anti-essentialist and anti-
subordination inter-group solidarity. It seeks to manifest and effectuate this
vision in the organization of LatCrit activities and through the performance
of the LatCrit community.' 3  Given these points of intersection and
these matters is beyond the scope of this essay, Harvey's materialist analysis has important
implications for the project to promote effective labor/community coalitions. These
implications are well worth further exploration, particularly in conjunction with current
efforts to center class in LatCrit theory. See, e.g., infra notes 93-97 and accompanying text.
12. See Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Structures of Subordination: Women of Color at the
Intersection of Title VII and the NLRA. Not!, 28 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 395, 401-03
(1993) [hereinafter Structures of Subordination] (revealing how essentialist categories of
race and class that organize American labor and employment law regimes enable women of
color to be both excluded from, and/or submerged within, majoritarian labor unions- thus
making the struggle for collective recognition a matter of unifying the identity
configurations that have been fragmented and fragmenting the identity configurations that
have been unified through the deployment of these essentialized categories); see also
Foreword: LatCrit III, supra note 7, at 629 (arguing that "a genuinely anti-essentialist
politics promises, always and everywhere, to reconstitute [any] group as a universal that
contains all particulars" and exploring implications for the way we should construct group
identities and align intergroup solidarity).
13. See Elivia R. Arriola, Foreword: March!, 19 CHICA_'O-LATNO L. Rnv. 1, 11-12
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convergence, LatCrit scholars and activists must carefully examine and
seriously engage these labor/community struggles, and the broader
aspirations to which they give substance, even as labor leaders and
community activists will undoubtedly benefit from a deeper involvement in
the LatCrit movement. 14
The title of this essay reflects a second theme that is particularly
salient to the articulation of a LatCrit perspective on any project to promote
effective labor/community coalitions. Though the future of LatCrit theory
may evolve along as many trajectories as its proponents are determined to
pursue, it began as an intervention in legal theory, focusing specifically on
the role of law in the process of achieving social justice.15 Accordingly,
this essay links the reconstruction of "community" to the deconstruction of
legal frameworks and, more specifically, to the deconstruction of those
legal structures that are most directly responsible for the de-politicization
and fragmentation of labor and community solidarity. The theoretical
claim implicit in this formulation is that the fragmentation of labor and
community is not only a matter of "false consciousness" or of cultural
ideologies, but also of legal doctrines and structures.
Legal doctrine is an important field of contestation. Legal
interpretation articulates substantive norms and organizes decisional
processes that directly and indirectly allocate power among competing
groups across every institutional arrangement that today constitutes the
16American political economy. By institutionalizing relations of
differential power among competing interests and social agents, law
organizes institutional class structures. 7 Revealing the relationship
(1998) (discussing the importance of respect for diversity and commitment to conflict
resolution in the context of LatCrit community building); Berta Esperanza Hemdndez-
Truyol, Building Bridges: Latinas and Latinos at the Crossroads, in THE LATINO/A
CONDITION: A CRICAL READER 24, 30-31 (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefanic eds., 1998)
(noting many ways Latinas/os can tap into the experience of intersectionality and
multidimensionality to build bridges across differences both within Latina/o communities
and between Latina/o and other minority communities); Out of the Shadow, supra note 4, at
351-58 (urging Latinas/os to explore commonalities with Asian Pacific Americans); Latino
Legal Scholarship, supra note 5 (exploring the possibilities and problems confronting
project to promote Latina/o pan-ethnic solidarity); Martinez, supra note 4; Yamamoto,
supra note 5.
14. See Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, The Labyrinth of Solidarity: Why the Future
of the American Labor Movement Depends on Latino Workers, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1089,
1098-1104 (1999) [hereinafter The Labyrinth of Solidarity] (arguing that the future of the
American labor movement and Latinas/os are inextricably interconnected).
15. See Under Construction, supra note 3, at 7.
16. See, e.g., Structures of Subordination, supra note 12, at 407-67 (examining the
structure of institutional power constructed through judicial articulation of the doctrine of
exclusive representation and its demobilizing impact on women of color in the workplace).
17. See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Global Markets, Racial Spaces and the Role of
Critical Race Theory in the Struggle for Community Control of Investments: An Institutional
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between the de-politicization and fragmentation of labor and community
groups on the one hand, and the legal production of these institutional class
structures on the other, is a critically important project. This is because the
legal production of institutional class structures plays a major role in
suppressing the mobilization of new collective solidarities and in the
formation of anti-essentialist political identities. These potential solidarities
and identities remain hostage to the institutional class structures embedded
in and reproduced through the articulation of essentialist categories of
identity and community. These categories permeate the interpretation of
legal doctrine and, thus, determine the adjudicated outcomes of institutional
class conflicts over the configuration of institutional power." Thus, from a
LatCrit perspective, any project to promote effective labor/community
coalitions must confront and combat the role of law and legal interpretation
in institutionalizing relations of power and powerlessness that demobilize
the collective identities and disorganize the inter-group solidarities on
which labor/community coalitions must depend for survival.
The third and final dimension of the project I see embedded in the
New Haven and Greensboro case studies reflects the fact that achieving
social, economic, and racial justice is ultimately a matter of
institutionalizing an alternative regime of substantive norms and decisional
procedures that can more fairly mediate the competing interests and claims
in the struggle for new relationships between labor, communities, and
capital. Consciousness-raising may inspire and mobilize the coalescence of
new political identities and collective solidarities. Deconstructive theory
may reveal the hypocrisies and instabilities of current legal regimes.
Ultimately, however, both our raised consciousness and our deconstructive
practices must help produce new institutional arrangements that are
genuinely inclusive, anti-essentialist, and participatory.
Part I of this Article sets the project of promoting effective
labor/community coalitions against the backdrop of three converging
dynamics: (1) the intensification of inter-capitalist competition in an
increasingly internationalized political economy; (2) the labor movement's
Class Analysis, 45 ViLL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2000) [hereinafter Global Markets, Racial
Spaces] (introducing and explaining "institutional class analysis" as interpretative
methodology linking internal doctrinal deconstruction to external critical analysis of the role
of law in configuring relations of institutional power/lessness, de/constructing political
identities, de/mobilizing collective action, and re/producing socioeconomic and political
subordination).
18. See, e.g., Structures of Subordination, supra note 12, at 402 n.23 (noting that
"essentialism" is not just a theoretical approach, but "also a constitutive principle" of the
institutional structures that organize and allocate power among different groups in particular
contexts-as demonstrated by the powerlessness and marginality produced by the complete
and total failure to recognize women of color as legitimate collective political identities in
the interpretative practices at the intersection of Title VII and the NLRA).
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history of racism, sexism and business unionism; and (3) the judicial
articulation and enforcement of an ideology of managerial discretion.
These three dynamics converge in the divide and conquer practices through
which the legally sanctioned hyper-mobility of capital has enabled the
American economic elite to fragment the working class and pit
communities against each other in a life or death competition for business
investments. 19
These three dynamics are clearly evident in the New Haven and
Greensboro case studies and reveal the extent to which the fragmentation of
labor and community is grounded in a material base of economic and
political power. Labor/community coalitions may, indeed, suffer from the
"false consciousness" produced by truncated notions of "community" and
inherited patterns of identity politics. However, they also suffer from the
divisive practices through which the American business elite have chosen
to respond to increased inter-capitalist competition. The problems
confronted by these two particular communities reveal the cumulative
impact of these general dynamics on local communities. Since every effort
to promote labor/community coalitions must contend with the impact of
these general dynamics, the New Haven and Greensboro case studies
provide valuable points of reference for identifying, confronting, and
combating the particular ways in which these three dynamics are at work in
the local histories and current difficulties of local communities throughout
this country.
Part II briefly focuses on some of the key legal doctrines through
which judicial ideology has indirectly promoted and, in various instances,
directly coerced the de-politicization and isolation of the labor movement.
The project to promote more effective and authentic labor/community
coalitions must not only contend with the fact that the fragmentation of
labor and community solidarity has a material base in the divisive tactics
and awesome power of business elites, but it must also contend with the
fact that this inter-group fragmentation has a legal base in the interpretative
decisions through which courts reproduce institutional class structures of
the American political economy.
19. See, e.g., CHICAGO: RACE, CLASS, AND THE RESPONSE TO URBAN DECLINE 16-17
(Gregory D. Squires et al. eds., 1987) [hereinafter CHICAGO] (critiquing dominant "growth
ideology" as an obstacle to growth). According to the editors, the incentives through which
cities and states seek to promote economic development have failed. "Tax abatements, low
interest loans, industrial revenue bonds and a variety of other financial incentives have
become favorite tools for economic development officials." liL at 16. But these types of
incentives have not been effective in attracting or creating jobs. "As municipalities and
states attempt to outbid each other with such incentives, businesses benefit by receiving an
ill-conceived subsidy. But no net gain in jobs occurs, tax revenues and public services
decline, and as a result some communities find the business climate even less attractive than
before the unaffordable incentives were offered." Id. at 16-17.
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My objective in Part II is to map some of the ways in which
labor/community coalitions are suppressed by the structural constraints
established through the fragmentation of domestic legal regimes like Title
VII and the NLRA.20 Both labor and community struggles for increased
control over, and participation in, the decision making processes through
which economic elites relocate businesses and allocate capital have also
been severely hampered by a discursive legal structure in which the
separation of politics and economics is routinely invoked to restrict
democratic participation in economic decision making.21 The significance
of this analysis is that it reveals the extent to which labor/community
fragmentation is an unsurprising "real world" consequence of the doctrines
articulated in the field of legal interpretation. This link between the
fragmentation of labor/community solidarity and the articulation of legal
doctrine makes critical legal theory a crucial element in the process of
transformation.2 The essay concludes with some brief reflections on the
kinds of legal reforms needed to enable the sorts of proposals forwarded by
Warren and Cohen in the New Haven case study.'
I. THE DIVISION OF LABOR, THE DISINVESTMENT OF COMMUNITIE AND
THE MATERIAL BASE OF ANARCHO-CAPITALISM
The obstacles confronting workers and their communities in places
like Greensboro and New Haven are intricately tied to the various strategies
through which United States companies have sought to redesign the social
relations and structures of production in individual firms and throughout
entire industries. By the late 1970s, the decreasing competitiveness of
20. See infra notes 66-91 and accompanying text. For a more extensive critique of the
doctrine of exclusive representation and its role in producing the political fragmentation of
both the labor and the civil rights movements, see Structures of Subordination, supra note
12. It is worth noting that the politics of fragmentation are also evident in the fragmentation
of international and domestic legal regimes. See Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Foreword:
International Law, Human Rights and LatCrit Theory, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 177,
180-82 (1997) [hereinafter Foreword: International Law] (arguing that international
advocacy and cross-national solidarities are undermined by fragmentation of international
and domestic legal regimes).
21. See Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Confronting Racial Inequality: LatCrit Reflections on
Law, Class and the Anti-Political Economy (unpublished work-in-progress, on file with
author) [hereinafter The Anti-Political Economy] (noting that the "anti-political economy"
refers to the structures of power that are legally produced by the rhetorical manipulation of
the separation of politics and economics in ways calculated to legitimate both the exclusion
of social justice concerns and democratic participation from the realm of "the market" and
the penetration and domination of the political realm by economic power).
22. For further reflections on the contributions Critical Race Theory, understood
specifically as a practice in the production of legal theory, can make to anti-subordination
struggles for social justice, see Global Markets, Racial Spaces, supra note 17.
23. See Warren & Cohen, supra note 2, at 654-55.
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American manufacturers, both internationally and in domestic markets, at
last sent shock waves through the once complacent power centers of
corporate America. Key decision makers began to recognize the
emergence of new international competitors, to reassess their comparative
advantages, and to experiment with new practices aimed at adapting
American companies to the changed environment of international
competition.24
These business practices have had, and continue to have, a profound
effect on the structure of production and income distribution in the United
States.25 Some of the most definitive economic phenomena of the 1980s
and 1990s can be traced to these practices. Plant closings and relocations,
increased poverty, and the growing segmentation of the American labor
market, in which work is divided into distinct, discontinuous, and
differentially privileged sectors where individual mobility between sectors
is increasingly restricted,26 can all be linked to strategic management
24. Compare, e.g., SAMUEL BOWLES ET AL., AFrER THE WASTELAND: A DEMOCRATIC
ECONOMICS FOR THE YEAR 2000 (1990) (providing historical context and critical analysis of
the ascendancy of right wing economic policies and their impact on human needs),
SEYMOUR MELMAN, THE PERMANENT WAR ECONOMY: AMERICAN CAPITALISM IN DECLINE
(Revised ed. 1985) (attributing the decline of American competitiveness to waste and
inefficiencies of "the war economy"), and THE CUOMO COMMISSION REPORT (1988)
(challenging the neoliberal economic agenda and offering alternative policy proposals aimed
at balancing short-term profit maximization with long-term sustainable economic growth),
with ROSABETH Moss KANTER, CHANGE MASTERS: INNOVATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN
THE AMERICAN CORPORATION (1983) (articulating and celebrating a "post-modern" ideology
of business Entrepreneurship and competitive initiative as a solution to "satisficing"
complacency and bureaucratic inertia reportedly responsible for the decline of American
core industries).
25. See, e.g., IN THE BARRIOS: LATINOS AND THE UNDERCLASS DEBATE (Joan Moore &
Raquel Pinderhuges eds., 1993) (exploring the impact of economic restructuring on different
Latina/o communities in the United States); Michael Knoll, Perchance to Dream, 66 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1599 (1993) (discussing the effect of economic globalization on domestic
income distribution and the disappearance of the middle class). For accounts of the impact
of economic restructuring on Latina/o workers in Latin America, see Catherine T. Barbieri,
Women Workers in Transition: The Potential Impact of the NAFTA Labor Side Agreement
on Women Workers in Argentina and Chile, 17 CoMP. LAB. L. 526 (1996); Manuel Fuentes
Muniz, The NAFTA Labor Side Accord in Mexico and its Repercussions for Workers, 10
CONN. J. INT'L L. 379 (1995) (examining the impact of U.S. style of industrialization on
Mexican workers); see also TOM BARRY, ZAPATA'S REVENGE: FREE TRADE AND THE CRISIS
IN MEmco (1995).
26. See generally, SUZANNE BERGER & MICHAEL J. PIORE, DUALISM AND
DISCONTINUITY 23-26 (1980) (explaining the theory of dual labor markets); Michael J.
Piore, Notes Toward Segmented Labor Market Theory, in LABOR MARKET SEGMENTATION
125-50 (Richard C. Edwards et al. eds., 1975) (explaining the elements and dynamics of
primary and secondary labor markets); see also DAVID M. GORDON ET AL., SEGMENTED
WORK, DIVIDED WORKERS 171-75 (1982) [hereinafter DIVIDED WORKERS] (tracing the
historical development of labor segmentation to the introduction of centralized personnel
planning in large firns).
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practices like offshore sourcing and increased subcontracting, as well as the
use of "team concept" work structures and "just-in-time" production
techniques.27 Indeed, these practices have spread through the American
economy at a pace that has led many commentators to conclude that the
post World War II structure of capitalist production and accumulation is
undergoing a fundamental revolution.
28
In the United States and throughout the world, the working class has
been forced to bear the major burden of economic restructuring.
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, workers and their communities suffered
waves of plant closings as primary sector manufacturers relocated
production to low-wage nonunion areas in the United States and the Third
World. These closures devastated entire communities, increased
homelessness, destroyed families, and plunged local economies of
dependent suppliers, distributors, and service contractors into bankruptcy.
Remaining companies have repeatedly capitalized on the fear, despair, and
powerlessness engendered by the threat of additional closures by extracting
significant concessions from labor unions, local government officials,
suppliers, and most everyone else with whom they deal. Like plant
closures, these concessions are extracted in order to lower costs and
increase profits at the expense of workers, their families, and their
communities.
The U.S. labor movement, by contrast, has for much of this time, been
mostly on the defensive. 29  As U.S. corporations change their
organizational structures as well as their patterns of investment and
production, U.S. labor organizations have been finding it harder and harder
to influence the decisions which most directly affect terms and conditions
27. See MIKE PARKER & JANE SLAUGHTER, CHOOSING SIDES: UNIONS AND THE TEAM
CONCEPT 3-30 (1988) [hereinafter CHOOSING SIDES] (providing detailed critical analysis of
team concept work structures and "just-in-time" production schedules and their impact in
undermining union power and solidarity both among union workers and between union and
non-union workers); see also infra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
28. See generally MICHAEL J. PIORE & CHARLES F. SABEL, THE SECOND INDUSTRIAL
DIvIDE: POSSIBILrrIES FOR PROSPERITY (1981) (arguing that American economic
deterioration results from the limits of models of industrial development founded on mass
production and mapping two alternative trajectories for relaunching economic productivity
and growth in advanced economies); DIVIDED WORKERS, supra note 26, at 2-18 (arguing
that current economic restructuring must be evaluated in light of the fact that American
capitalism has experienced at least three earlier periods of sustained economic crisis,
providing historical account linking current inability of the American working class to
develop a unified agenda for combating current projects to restructure economy in the image
of a dominant business elite to the internal disunity among working class people, and
arguing that this disunity is directly linked to the ways in which American
labor/management strategies re/organized work and re/structured labor markets in response
to these three earlier periods of crisis in the historical development of American capitalism).
29. See ORGANIZING TO WIN: NEW RESEARCH ON UNION STRATEGIES 5-6 (Kate
Bronfenbrenner et al. eds., 1998) [hereinafter ORGANIZING TO WIN].
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of employment-indeed, the very existence of employment in the United
States. This is partly because the legal structure of American labor
relations disproportionately empowers management and restricts the
exercise of collective power by American workers.30
In the United States, management's ability to transform economic
relations is greatly facilitated, and to a large extent depends upon, a legal
ideology that equates unfettered management discretion with economic
efficiency and ultimately with the "public good." Despite the fact that
workers, community groups, and local governments are deeply affected by
the investment decisions of private for-profit corporations, American courts
have repeatedly rejected the various legal claims through which affected
labor and community groups have attempted to influence the outcomes of
these "private" decisions."' Indeed, the relative powerlessness with which
labor and community groups confront corporate decision makers is, itself in
large part, an artifact of judicial construction. This is because courts have
systematically and cumulatively eliminated most avenues of legal recourse
that might otherwise alter the institutional class structures through which
private corporate managerial discretion dominates and otherwise preempts
community participation in "private" economic decisions.32
Numerous legal scholars have criticized the courts' public/private
ideology as fundamentally incoherent and class biased.33  However, the
underlying ideology also embraces a whole range of assumptions
concerning the institutional prerequisites for economic efficiency.34 As a
30. See generally Francis Lee Ansley, Standing Rusty and Rolling Empty: Law, Poverty
and America's Eroding Industrial Base, 81 GEO. L.J. 1757 (1993) (analyzing doctrinal
devolution expanding the scope of employer unilateral control over "core entrepreneurial
business decisions" such as whether to sell, close or relocate a business); Elizabeth M.
Iglesias, La Transformacidn Econdmica y El Movimiento Obrero Estadounidense, 4 EL
OTRo DERECHO 5, 9 (1992) [Economic Transformation and the American Labor Movement]
[hereinafter La Transformacidn Econ6mica] (arguing that "[n]o account of the
"deindustrialization of America" is complete without a close look at the legal framework
and the underlying ideological assumptions through which the American judiciary has
repeatedly protected the mobility of capital at management's exclusive discretion and
reaffirmed the predominance of capitalist accumulation over community interests").
31. See, e.g., Local 1330 United Steel Workers of America v. United States Steel Corp.,
631 F.2d 1264 (6th Cir. 1980) (refusing to recbgnize community property rights as a basis
for enjoining management to sell a factory it had decided to close despite evidence the firm
was still profitable and closure would have a devastating impact on the community that had
assisted the company with public subsidies and other "givebacks").
32. See Global Markets, Racial Spaces, supra note 17.
33. See, e.g., Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 113-24
(1984) (noting and rebutting the critique that Klare's analysis was based on questionable
assumptions about the radical nature of the Wagner Act); Karl E. Klare, Judicial
Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-
1941, 62 MiNN. L. REv. 265 (1978) [hereinafter, Judicial Deradicalization].
34. See generally The Anti-Political Economy, supra note 21 (deconstructing the
representation of "economic efficiency" and "free market competition" through an
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result, the future of American working people and communities depends, at
least in part, on reconstructing domestic labor law regimes and the
ideological prejudices and assumptions that inform its routine articulation
in specific socio-legal contexts.
More fundamentally, American labor must find ways to overcome the
deep divisions, which the last twenty years of economic dislocation and
managerial strategic responses have driven into the working class
consciousness. Three particularly popular managerial "innovations" of the
1980s illustrate the point in compelling detail: (1) the importation of
Japanese production techniques like the team concept and "just-in-time"
production scheduling; (2) the introduction of two-tiered compensation
systems; and (3) plant relocations to non-union low wage areas in the
United States and the Third World. Each of these three strategies shares a
common element-each seeks to increase profits by capitalizing on power
differentials across distinct sectors of the working class, both within and
beyond the United States.
A. Plant Relocation
Plant relocations increase profits by exploiting the relative
powerlessness of non-unionized and Third World workers as compared to
unionized workers in advanced industrial countries. The story of American
plant closings is a particularly instructive window into the politics of
division at an international level. Management advocates often
characterize plant relocations as a necessary response to increased
competition from Third World producers. In this account, the low wages
accepted by Third World workers give Third World producers a
comparative advantage in labor intensive production. Confronted by
cheaper (and often better) foreign products, American companies blamed
their lack of competitiveness on the high wages commanded by a militant
domestic labor movement. Offshore sourcing was promoted as the obvious
solution.
By relocating to low wage areas, American firms seek to internalize
the comparative advantage of their Third World competitors, namely a low
wage labor force. However, offshore sourcing affords only a temporary
advantage because the higher profits are not based on permanent
manufacturing improvements or technological innovations. Instead, plant
relocations to non-union areas are just another way to increase profits by
"sweating" the workforce. This reality is disguised, however, by
characterizing plant relocations as a vehicle for Third World economic
institutional class analysis of the way economic and political power are configured in the
legal construction of an anti-political and racially segmented economy).
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development. In this context, plant relocations are called "foreign direct
investment." The arguments are simple. Foreign direct investment creates
employment in underdeveloped countries. Employment generates income.
Income stimulates demand, which in turn encourages investment, and
eventually results in a diversified local economy. Thus, from this
perspective, the relocation of American businesses to Third World
countries is cast as an engine of Third World development 5
Plant relocations do create employment in the Third World, but at
exceedingly low wages. American multinationals operating there have
made it clear that their continued presence depends on wages remaining
low. Indeed, despite dirt-cheap wages, Ford workers at the plant in
Hermosillo, Mexico were forced to strike for thirty-nine days when Ford
refused to pay a legally required cost-of-living increase.3 6 Ford workers
involved in union struggles for higher wages and safer working conditions
have also been met with violence.37 As a result, it is unlikely that this form
of "foreign direct investment" will generate any meaningful or sustainable
economic development in the Third World.
Foreign direct investment appears even more questionable as a
development mechanism when compared to other alternatives-
specifically those aimed at encouraging domestic producers. Compared to
domestic producers, foreign capitalists routinely tend to repatriate profits
for investment or distribution in their home countries, rather than
reinvesting in the local economies of the host country. 8 Moreover, foreign
investment (especially investment involving plant relocations) is often
aimed at establishing production platforms for export markets in the First
World, rather than for local consumption needs. In short, plant relocations
operate as a profit-maximizing strategy by capitalizing on the relative
powerlessness and desperate economic situation of the most vulnerable
workers in the world, even as the dominant ideology enables American
businesses to represent themselves as the champions of competitive
efficiency and economic development against the special interests of an
unproductive and parochial labor union aristocracy.
35. See generally NCAA, REPORT ON THE AMERICAS: THE NEW GOSPEL NORTH
AMERICAN FREE TRADE, VOL. 26, No. 6 (May 1991).
36. See CHOOSING SIDES, supra note 27, at 217-218.
37. See M. Witt, Auto Workers Mount Continental Protest, CANADIAN DIMENSION,
Apr.-May 1991, at 32; see also Kathy McAffee, STORM SIGNALS: STRUCTURAL ADJUSTmENT
AND DEVELOPMENT ALTERNATIVES IN THE CARIBBEAN 85-86 (1991) (describing tactics used
by foreign factory owners to suppress worker unionization and demands for higher wages in
Caribbean Free Trade Zones-including threat of plant relocations).
38. This problem has long been well understood. See THEODORE H. MORAN,
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND THE POLITICS OF DEPENDENCE: COPPER IN CHILE 102-
03 (1974) (discussing how Kennecott used profits from its Chilean operations to finance
construction of a copper refinery in Maryland in order to refine Chilean copper in Maryland,
rather than in Chile).
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B. "Just-in-Time" Production Scheduling
Similarly, the increased profits attributed to "just-in-time" production
techniques are derived, at least in part, from substantial wage differentials
between unionized firms and their nonunion subcontractors.39 Just-in-time
is a popular name for Japanese inventory and assembly-line production
systems in which productive divisions do not produce until they receive
signals that more parts are needed by the next division down the line.
Business magazines promote this approach as a generally applicable
strategy for increasing productivity and competitiveness. However, a close
analysis suggests that just-in-time production methods increase profits only
because they facilitate speed-ups and externalize the costs of production. A
brief comparison with traditional productive systems provides a useful
illustration.
In traditionally organized mass production assembly lines, the main
objective is to keep the line going at all costs. Stopping the production line
is like inducing a heart attack because the profitability of assembly line
mass production depends on maintaining maximum output at all times.
Consequently, everything in the traditional assembly plant is organized to
keep the line going. Each productive division tries to maintain an adequate
stock of essential input parts to insulate itself from problems in preceding
divisions. Temporary workers are employed to fill in for absentees. When
defective work or materials are observed, workers often fix them later,
rather than to stop the line, even though defects may be harder to reach at a
later point in time. In short, traditional manufacturing plants are managed
to keep production going by keeping extra resources on hand.
Just-in-time is a very different system based on a very different
philosophy.4° The basic premise is that maintaining extra resources wastes
39. For a more detailed description of "team concept" and "just-in-time" production
processes and their implications for union power and worker solidarity, see CHOOSING
SinEs, supra note 27, at 3-30; La Transformacidn Econdmica, supra note 30, at 18-23. See
also Doug Gamble & Nina Gregg, Rethinking the Twenty-First Century Workplace: Unions
and Workplace Democracy, 1 U. PA. J. LAB & EMP. L. 429 (1998) (arguing that genuine
workplace democracy requires institutionalization of procedures for workers to influence
basic business and production decisions traditionally reserved to management discretion
without management domination); Susan Sturm, Race, Gender and the Law in the Twenty-
First Century Workplace: Some Preliminary Observations, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 639,
646-51 (1998) (exploring the way racial and gender dynamics influence decisional
processes in self-goveming teams).
40. Unlike traditional firms, firms using just-in-time methods encourage workers to
stop the line whenever they see any trouble. The theory is that it is better to stop production
than to allow defective products to slip through. In fact, stopping the line is a tactical
strategy for constantly identifying and eliminating extra slack in the assembly line. Just-in-
time managers get worried if the line never stops because this means either that the line has
too many extra resources or that problems are slipping through uncorrected. The solution is
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money and reduces productivity. The main objective is to identify and
eliminate any extra slack at any given point in the production process.
Rather than maintaining inventories of extra parts, management reorganizes
its supply systems to ensure that parts arrive only when they are needed for
actual production. In many cases, this means shifting the costs of
maintaining inventories to the smaller satellite supplier firms, which are
required to deliver directly to the assembly line two and three times a day.
This practice increases the smaller firms' costs, increasing their incentive to
continue paying low wages and thereby maintaining (if not increasing) the
primary and secondary sector wage differential.
41
This analysis suggests that American firms can only afford to
implement just-in-time techniques if they are supported by dependent
suppliers who are willing to internalize the costs of assuring on-time
delivery numerous times a day. Not every firm has the economic power to
shift these costs to their suppliers (and the suppliers' employees). It is,
therefore, not surprising that large American automobile manufacturers
were at the cutting edge of introducing the just-in-time technique. These
firms have the kind of economic power needed to compel their suppliers to
adjust to these new demands and the type of mobility which allows them to
play workers, in different parts of the country and across the globe, against
each other. Many American union workers have accepted these new
practices out of fear that the company will simply relocate if the workers
oppose them. They have good reasons for their fears. The Toyota-GM
joint venture, called NUMMI (New United Motors Manufacturing, Inc.),
was one of the first plants to implement just-in-time techniques in the
United States.42 This plant opened in Fremont, California in 1984 in an old
GM plant that had closed two years earlier. Most of the workers at
NUMMI had worked at the GM plant before it closed. Despite the difficult
working conditions, these workers had no desire to oppose the new
practices, in large part because they were so frightened that the plant might
close.43
C. Two-Tiered Compensation Systems
Like plant relocations and just-in-time production techniques, two-
tiered compensation systems are another way of increasing profits by
to remove resources, for example, by eliminating some workers and redistributing their jobs.
As resources are removed, problems appear; when they do, management analyzes and
corrects them, then resumes production with fewer employees, who now work harder than
before. See CHOOSING SIDES, supra note 27, at 16-17.
41. See id. at 25.
42. See id. at 16.
43. See id. at 111.
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exploiting the lower wages of a disempowered sector of the labor force."
Union collective bargaining agreements have traditionally allocated wages,
transfer rights, job security, and other employment benefits through a
seniority based system in which less senior workers receive lower
compensation than their more senior coworkers. However, under the
traditional system, less senior workers can eventually expect to earn the
same wages and benefits enjoyed by their more senior coworkers as they
accumulate seniority. In contrast, two-tiered compensation systems are
structured so that the lower-tier and upper-tier workers are on completely
different tracks. In these systems, lower-tier workers (namely, new hires)
earn less compensation and have less job security than their upper-tier
coworkers at each level of seniority, unless the collective bargaining
agreement has a "catch-up" provision.
Two-tiered wage compensation systems allow management to
increase profits at the expense of new hires. New employees are the least
powerful workers in the firm, and increasing proportions of such
employees are women and racial minorities. These systems are worth
particular attention for two additional reasons. First, two-tiered systems are
often introduced through collective bargaining agreements negotiated with
union representatives. Faced with management's ostensibly nonnegotiable
demands to reduce total labor costs, unions must choose whether to spread
the burden throughout the workforce or impose the entire burden on a
particular group. Given this choice, unions have favored the interests of
existing workers at the expense of future workers and the long term
interests of workers as a class. In other words, the economic subordination
of one group of workers is determined by the superior institutional power
of another.
Two-tiered compensation systems are also significant precisely
because they are entirely legal. A union's power to subordinate the
interests of one group of workers to the interests of another is theoretically
limited by law. The judicially constructed duty of fair representation
prohibits unions from intentionally discriminating against any members of
the bargaining unit.45 By implication, however, the doctrine of fair
representation authorizes union decisions favoring one group over another,
absent "invidious discrimination." However, if unions did not have this
authority, management's attempts to shift adjustment costs onto labor
would undoubtedly face a much more unified and militant workforce since
the more powerful workers would be just as affected as the least powerful
44. See generally Note, Two-Tier Wage Discrimination and the Duty of Fair
Representation, 98 HAv. L. REv. 631 (1985).
45. See Structures of Subordination, supra note 12, at 447-57 (criticizing judicial
interpretation of the duty of fair representation as profoundly inadequate to ensure rights of
minority workers in majoritarian unions).
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workers. Thus, by authorizing union elites to make these kinds of trade-
offs among workers, American labor law ensures that American labor
unions will not represent an undifferentiated working class agenda, but will
instead operate like administrative agencies allocating burdens and benefits
between competing interests at the service of management's "bottom
line."46 A renewed labor movement in the United States, thus depends in
part upon reconstructing the legal framework within which unions operate.
The three managerial innovations and profit maximizing strategies
reflected in the proliferation of plant relocations, the introduction of just-in-
time production techniques, and the establishment of two-tiered wage
systems reveal the degree to which the project of increasing American
business profitability has been built on strategies that divide the working
class and exploit its least powerful sectors. Viewed cumulatively, these
various practices reflect strategic decisions to meet the challenges of
increased inter-capitalist competition by competing, in one way or another,
on the basis of lowered labor costs. However, competition based on
eliminating jobs and lowering wages has had disastrous macroeconomic
consequences both for working class communities in the de-industrializing
north and for sustainable economic development in the impoverished
communities of the southern United States and the Third World countries
to which these jobs have often been exported.47
Equally important, this form of competition cannot sustain stable,
long-term prosperity. This is because the loss of high-wage production
jobs drastically reduces effective demand in the First World, even as dirt-
cheap wages mean ineffective demand in the Third World as well. Third
World workers are increasingly producing goods, which they themselves
cannot afford to buy,48 for export to First World markets where
46. See generally George Feldman, Unions, Solidarity, and Class: The Limits of Liberal
Labor Law, 15 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 187 (1994); Richard Michael Fischl, Self,
Others and Section 7: Mutualism and Protected Protest Activities Under the NLRA, 89
CoLtuM. L. REv. 789 (1989).
47. See, e.g., Roberto L. Corrada, A Personal Re/View of Latinola Identity, Gender and
Class Issues in the Context of the Labor Dispute Between Sprint and La Connexion
Familiar, 53 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1065 (1999) (recounting Sprint's relocation to escape
unionization).
48. See, e.g., Richard Peet, The Geography of Class Struggle and Relocation of U.S.
Manufacturing Industry, in INTERNAnTONALISM AND INDUSTRIAL RESTRuCTURiNG 40-65
(Richard Peet ed., 1987). Peet notes that the reduction in worker income resulting from
plant relocations to non-union low-wage areas "weakened the central determining
relationship between mass consumption and the capital goods industries at the center of the
world capitalist system. Increasingly, peripheral low-waged workers produced
commodities which they themselves could not afford to buy, but central workers also could
no longer afford because high-paying unionized jobs were fast disappearing." 1L at 64
(emphasis added); see also STORM SIGNALS, supra note 37, at 42 (noting that Caribbean
women factory workers "could hardly afford to buy the clothes they cut and stitch for 60
cents an hour or less, even if the garments were for sale locally").
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consumption is sustained by a bubble economy of consumer credit.
49
Ultimately, then, the internationalization of the American economy means
that a strong American labor movement and economically sustainable
communities depend on the development of new institutional and
procedural arrangements for promoting trans/national labor solidarity and
for enforcing basic social and economic rights across the various and varied
inter/national regions where American businesses compete.
50
D. Application to the Greensboro and New Haven Case Studies
Against this backdrop, the two case studies featured in this
Symposium provide a valuable point of reference for examining the
possibilities and obstacles confronting the future of the American labor
movement in general, and of multi-racial, interclass, labor/community
coalitions in particular.5 ' These two case studies recount the coalescence of
labor/community coalitions in reaction to a series of labor/management
disputes arising from the labor practices and policies of two business
enterprises: a Kmart distribution center in Greensboro, North Carolina and
the OMNI at Yale in New Haven, Connecticut.52  In doing so, they
49. See, e.g., Henry J. Sommer, Causes of the Consumer Bankruptcy Explosion: Debtor
Abuse or Easy Credit?, 27 HOFSTRA L. REv. 33, 37-38 (1998) (linking increased consumer
bankruptcy cases to massive marketing of credit cards, itself, spurred by increased spread
between credit card interest rates and cost of funds to lenders).
50. See Francis Lee Ansley, Rethinking Law in Globalizing Labor Markets, 1 U. PA. J.
LAB. & Emp. L. 369, 410-13 (1998) (delineating eight different strategies proposed and/or
implemented to promote internationally effective labor rights); The Labyrinth of Solidarity,
supra note 14, at 1112-13 (noting that internationalization of business requires
internationalization of the labor movement); Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Human Rights in
International Economic Law: Locating Latinas/os in the Linkage Debate, 28 U. MIAMI
IN'rR-AM. L. REV. 361, 366-76 (1997) (analyzing four alternative models for linking
enforcement of labor rights to trade and finance regimes regulated by international
economic law).
51. See generally Warren & Cohen, supra note 2; Hair, supra note 2.
52. It is interesting that the labor/community coalitions featured in these two case
studies focus on labor/management disputes in sectors traditionally marginal to the post-
WWII labor agenda. These struggles center around service sector workers in business
enterprises particularly linked to the local economies in which they are situated, rather than
manufacturing industries producing for national and international markets. Distribution
centers, like the Kmart center in Greensboro, service regional retail outlets, while hotel and
conference services, like those offered by the Omni at Yale, depend on visitors to the local
area. The fact that these kinds of business enterprises are inherently less "mobile," than
manufacturing industries (though not entirely immobile) makes them prime candidates for
labor organizing initiatives, precisely because mobility has so often been the threat used to
suppress union activities and extract concessions. But for the devaluation of labor market
sectors occupied by women and minorities, it would seem obvious that union organizing
strategists would target such sectors as part of a broader strategy of countering the politics
of concession and promoting more a militant and proactive labor consciousness and
movement. See The Labyrinth of Solidarity, supra note 14, at 1107-08 (noting that labor
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foreground the interdependence and connection between worker struggles
for economic justice and the general interests of all citizens in sustainable
livable communities. They celebrate the solidarity concerned and
courageous people can produce through their collective actions and
commitment to a common struggle. They also underscore the substantial
challenges still facing our efforts to move beyond an ad-hoc politics of
interest convergence to a genuine ethic of mutual recognition. One major
challenge, in particular, is clearly evident. That is the challenge of
envisioning and achieving the legal institutionalization of more appropriate
procedures and effective venues for the kinds of inter-group collaborations
without which both the labor movement and the many marginalized
communities throughout this country will remain hostage to the
vulnerability of disaggregation and fragmentation.f
The Greensboro and New Haven case studies each tell the story of the
way common interests shared by labor and community groups are often
misapprehended as a result of the fragmentation produced by an ideology
of "separate jurisdictions" and a politics of division. In both cases, public
discourse and community sentiment readily cast the workers' struggles for
union representation and basic justice in the workplace as just another
instance of special interest politics. The workers' demands for justice were
initially deemed irrelevant to the broader community in which they lived.
Indeed, their union organizing efforts were viewed as affirmatively
inimical to the broader community's compelling interest in revitalizing the
local economy and maintaining public order.
One ready explanation for why the broader communities in
Greensboro and New Haven failed to see their own interests and identities
implicated in the workers' struggles lays the blame for community
disengagement on the exclusionary visions of community that have
truncated the transformative potential of the labor movement, on the one
hand, and the civil rights movement, on the other5 Indeed, the New
strategists need to critically assess the degree of enterprise mobility in different sectors and
industries, rather than simply acquiesce to threats of closure and relocation, since "certain
types of manufacturing businesses are extremely sensitive to their locations ... [and] cannot
easily pack up and move away to avoid a union without jeopardizing their access to
important markets").
53. See, e.g., Structures of Subordination, supra note 12, at 498-502 (explaining how
jurisprudential fragmentation of Title VII and the NLRA is directly linked to the political
fragmentation currently dividing the labor movement from other progressive social
movements and explaining how jurisprudential unification of these regimes would support
the development of an institutional framework for more effective and meaningful
collaboration between the labor movement and others like the civil rights and feminist
movements).
54. See Marion Crain & Ken Matheny, Labor's Divided Ranks: Privilege and the
United Front Ideology, 84 CoRNELL L. REv. 1542 (1999); Karl E. Klare, The Quest for
Industrial Democracy and the Struggle Against Racism: Perspectives from Labor Law and
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Haven case study makes this point explicitly. The authors recount the
resistance HERE union leaders confronted from New Haven community
leaders in 1996, when the union requested community support in their
struggle against Yale University's plans to contract out 600 union jobs to a
non-union employer. Previously, these same community leaders had
responded quite positively to the union's earlier requests for support in
organizing a bargaining unit of Yale's clerical and technical workers. This
second time around, however, community leaders resisted the union's
request for support because the union had been noticeably absent from
important community justice struggles that had arisen in the interim.5
To deal with this community non-response, the union had to devise
and implement a new organizing strategy that could effectively reveal how
deeply the interests and future prospects of the broader New Haven
community were directly implicated in the union's struggle against Yale's
plan to out-source union jobs to a non-union contractor. By establishing
neighborhood organizing communities, holding meetings in the
neighborhoods where union members lived, and raising community
consciousness of the direct link between the loss of union jobs and the
economic decline of the communities that depended on these workers'
income, the union was able to overcome the fragmentation that its own lack
of attention to broader community struggles had helped to generate.
56
In retrospect, this organizing strategy was clearly a necessary and
appropriate response to the particular situation the union encountered. The
union's ability to engage in a self-critical analysis and to learn from the
consequences of its previous practices also reflects the appropriateness of
attributing the problem of political fragmentation to the elitist actions and
exclusionary attitudes of labor union elites. There is no question that the
decline of union membership and the labor movement's increasing
ineffectuality are, in part, attributable to the truncated politics that produced
a formal retreat from any effort to effectuate a broad and inclusive vision of
Civil Rights Law, 61 OR. L. REV. 157, 162-64 (1982) (attributing the labor movement's
weakness to its failure to oppose racism and the civil rights movement's weakness to its
failure to engage class); cf. Foreword International Law, supra note 20, at 181 n.4 (stressing
the point that race- and class-based essentialisms that have divided the civil rights and labor
movements are not just matters of limited consciousness, but also constitutive elements, that
are structurally embedded in the institutional arrangements that channel the enforcement and
articulation of civil rights and labor rights into very different, and discontinuous, projects
and processes); Structures of Subordination, supra note 12, at 398-403 (developing a
comprehensive critique of the way labor/community solidarity has been fragmented by the
class-based essentialism of the labor movement and the race-based essentialism of the civil
rights movement, but attributing both to the "structural violence" produced by "the politics
of interpretative fragmentation" that has denied these movements the institutional
framework in which to establish genuinely meaningful collaborative relationships).
55. See Warren & Cohen, supra note 2, at 640-41.
56. See icL at 641.
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social and economic justice. When the labor movement decided to focus
primarily on the terms and conditions of employment affecting certain
privileged sectors of the American workforce, it settled for a morally
uninspired and politically regressive form of "business unionism.
5 7
Attributing the labor movement's current isolation from other progressive
social movements, both within and beyond the United States, to its failure
to take its own purported commitment to solidarity and mutual assistance
seriously enough--or to define its solidaristic commitments broadly
enough may, thus, encourage unions to change their attitudes and practices
in ways that can actually make a difference, as demonstrated by the success
of HERE's innovative community-based organizing efforts in New Haven.
It is also true that, viewed against a backdrop of perennial debates
over the relative significance of structural constraints and the possibilities
of agency in the process of social transformation, locating the problem of
labor/community fragmentation in the politics and practices of labor union
elites emphasizes the role of agency. If the problem is a failed
consciousness, then the solution is a new consciousness.5 9 This emphasis
on consciousness-raising is also reflected in the struggles of the Kmart
workers in Greensboro.
57. See, e.g., BETH SIMS, WORKERS OF THE WORLD UNDERMINED: AMERICAN LABOR'S
ROLE IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 4-6 (1992) (recounting how business unionism was born of
Samuel Gompers call for "trade unionism pure and simple"). Sims notes that "[b]y
emphasizing narrow, sectoral interests, business unionism tends to isolate groups of workers
from one another. It likewise hampers the creation of coalitions with other sectors in
society, such as environmental activists, or the homeless and unemployed." Id. at 4-5. Sims
later adds that "[a]s alternatives to class-based analyses, the AFL-CIO and its institutes offer
prescriptions for 'apolitical' trade unionism aimed at increasing the size of the pie through
enhanced productivity and labor's piece of the pie through collective bargaining. This
promotion of a so-called apolitical trade unionism, however, is a political choice with
political outcomes. Refusing to question the underlying assumptions and relationships of
capitalism, the U.S. federation has demonized radical responses to capitalist exploitation and
failed to come to grips with the fact that misery breeds militancy. In doing so, the AFL-CIO
has, intentionally or not, supported the global economic and political status." Id. at 6. For a
brief account of an alternative vision of unionism espoused by the Knights of Labor and the
early CIO, see KiM MOODY, AN INJURY TO ALL: THE DECLINE OF AMERICAN UNIONISM xiv-
xv (1988).
58. See, e.g., Foreword: LatCrit III, supra note 7, at 612-13 & nn.82-88 (reflecting on
significance of structure versus agency in the process of social transformation).
59. See BELL HOOKS, TEACHING TO TRANSGRESS: EDUCATION AS THE PRACTICE OF
FREEDOM 47 (1994) (discussing the importance of consciousness raising and ideological
evolution in the process of social transformation and individual self-determination); cf.
Global Markets, Racial Spaces, supra note 17, at nn.18-24 and accompanying text (stating
that human agency and the will to flourish may produce moments of revolutionary change,
but social justice and the profound and lasting transformations upon which justice ultimately
depends require new institutional arrangements, whose procedures and substantive norms
can make the articulation and enforcement of emancipatory values a routine practice
internal to the institutional decision making processes at issue, rather than a matter of
extraordinary external mobilization by excluded interests and voices).
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Like the Yale workers in New Haven, the Kmart workers confronted a
community that was, at best, non-responsive and in some instances
positively hostile to their efforts to challenge, expose, and transform the
allegedly unsafe working conditions and abusive employment practices to
which they were subjected. However, in this case, the political
fragmentation that initially marked the relationship between the Kmart
workers and the broader community was not directly attributable to any
particular union's prior relatiofiship with the Greensboro community. The
Kmart workers were unorganized. Indeed, their initial efforts to enlist
union assistance in organizing the Kmart distribution center fell on deaf
ears.60 Instead, in this case, the truncated consciousness that initially
blinded the Greensboro community to the Kmart workers' compelling
claims of justice reflects the social dominance of a generalized anti-union
ideology and the material realities of power and privilege that have stripped
the meaning of community of its solidaristic implications and reduced the
practice of "community building" to a competition for business
investments.
Like the Omni workers in New Haven, Kmart workers confronted a
community caught in a virulent race to the bottom, itself triggered by the
hyper mobility that has unleashed capital from labor61 and has enabled the
project of community development to be disfigured into a profit-
maximizing enterprise.62 In both instances, the Kmart and OMNI workers
were up against employers that had been affirmatively recruited into the
community by public subsidies and concessions. 63 Community elites,
60. Several unions turned down the Kmart workers before the American Clothing and
Textile Workers Union (ACTWU) agreed to represent them. Their collective bargaining
representative is now called UNITE, which was formed through a merger between ACTWU
and the International Ladies Garment Workers Union (ILGWU). See Hair, supra note 2, at
662. For an analysis of the way judicial interpretation of federal labor laws has created a
legal structure that enables unions to avoid organizing labor units and sectors occupied by
women and minorities, see Structures of Subordination, supra note 12, at 439-45.
61. See, e.g., A. Sivananda, All That Is Solid Melts into Air: The Hokum of New Times,
RACE & CLASS, Jan.-Mar. 1990, at 8-9 (arguing that "[w]hat is crucial here is not that the
productive forces have altered the balance of dependency between Capital and Labour, but
that they have altered it so radically as to allow Capital to free itself of Labour and yet hold
Labour captive").
62. See, e.g., CHICAGO, supra note 19, at 16-17; RANDY STOECKER, DEFENDING
CoMMuNrrY: THE STRUGGLE FOR ALTERNATIVE REDEVELOPMENT IN CEDAR-RIVERSIDE
(1994) (locating the emergence of militant interclass coalitions to combat the
commodification of city habitat to a critical analysis of the impact of capitalist profit-
maximizing logic that reduces the process of community development to the production of
exchange values, rather than use values, and its negative consequences for sustainable and
livable communities).
63. See Warren & Cohen, supra note 2, at 643-44 (recounting concessions to Omni);
Hair, supra note 2, at 661 (noting concessions Kmart negotiated from the city and county
including construction of roads and public water lines to the site).
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informed by and invested in an elitist and exclusionary project of
"economic development," had a whole range of stock responses readily
available for dismissing the plight of the Kmart workers and for
delegitimizng their efforts to combat the alleged abusive and discriminatory
employment practices at the Kmart distribution center. Elected officials
refused to intervene on the grounds that the matter constituted a
labor/management dispute. The voice of "public opinion" decried the
negative impact that labor unrest and public disruptions, orchestrated by
interfering "outsiders," would have on external perceptions of the
community's stability. Thus, the workers' struggles were readily cast as
threats to the broader community's compelling interest in creating an
attractive environment for business investment.
Leaders of the faith community were also vulnerable to rhetorical
misrepresentations of their motives and actions. Rather than
acknowledging the courage it takes to take a stand on behalf of any
isolated, marginal and powerless group of persons, religious leaders who
worked to mobilize community moral sentiment on behalf of the Kmart
workers confronted yet another discourse of fragmentation. This discourse
pretends to separate the moral from the political. In other words, they, like
others before them and others still to follow, were told to stick to the
otherworldly matters of promoting faith and morals, rather than fomenting
a politics of human self-assertion and self-determination among the
marginalized and dispossessed workers of Greensboro. 
6
In short, the Greensboro case study reveals the vast array of rhetorical
strategies through which community elites sought to isolate the Kmart
workers, to discourage community concern for their plight, and to de-
legitimize the unselfish acts of courage through which leaders of the faith
community sought to express their solidarity with the Kmart workers. The
64. For reflections on the relationship between religion and the theoretical and political
commitments of the LatCrit project, see Keith Aoki, (Re)Presenting Representation, 2
HARv. LATINO L. REv. 247 (1997); Max J. Castro, The Missing Center? Cuba's Catholic
Church, 19 CmcANo-LATINO L. Rnv. 493, 500 (1998) (noting that the Catholic Church does
not always play a liberating or anti-subordination role in Cuban society); Elizabeth M.
Iglesias & Francisco Valdes, Afterword: Religion, Gender, Sexuality, Race and Class in
Coalitional Theory: A Critical and Self-Critical Analysis of LatCrit Social Justice Agendas,
19 CmcANo-LATINO L. REV. 503, 511-45 (1998) (noting same and giving further examples
of complicity of organized religion in the perpetuation of racial subordination and political
repression); Kevin R. Johnson, Foreword-Celebrating LatCrit Theory: What Are We
Going to Do When the Music Stops?, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. (forthcoming Spring 2000);
Guadalupe T. Luna, Gold, Souls and Wandering Clerics: California Missions, Native,
Californians and LatCrit Theory, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REv.(forthcoming Spring 2000); Laura
M. Padilla, Latinas & Religion: Subordination or State of Grace? 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REv.
(forthcoming Spring 2000); Terry Rey, The Virgin's Slip is Full of Fireflies: The Multiform
Struggle over the Virgin Mary's Legitimierende Macht in Latin America and its Diasporic
Communities, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. (forthcoming Spring 2000).
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fact that the Kmart distribution center was ultimately unionized gives
witness to the power of human agency in the face of overwhelming odds
and the structural asymmetries of power that produce them.65 However, the
fact that members of the faith community had to get arrested to make this
change possible speaks to the fundamental injustice of an institutional
reality in which the structural asymmetries of power exact such
extraordinary sacrifices and demand such extraordinary courage.
Indeed, while the Greensboro case study attests to the personal power
and ethical integrity of those particular individuals, who can and do
transcend their context, it also constitutes damning evidence of the
substantive and procedural injustice embedded in the institutional
structures that currently constitute the American political economy.
Existing institutional arrangements are fundamentally unjust precisely
because they produce asymmetries of power that make the achievement of
basic justice depend on such extraordinary efforts. Institutionalizing social
and economic justice requires more. Ultimately, it requires institutional
arrangements that provide effective venues and procedures for achieving
just solutions on a routine basis without requiring such extraordinary
efforts.
At the same time, the project of producing alternative institutional
arrangements is a project that deeply implicates the politics of judicial
interpretation. Whatever momentary victory is achieved "on the streets,"
through government intervention or some legislative enactment, the
ideologies embedded in judicial precedents and reproduced by the
interpretative practices through which these precedents are applied in
adjudication constitute a formidable discursive and material limitation for
the project of producing alternative institutional arrangements. It is to
these matters that I now turn.
II. LABOR/COMMUNITY SOLIDARITY AND THE LEGAL PRODUCTION OF
SEGMENTED SOCIAL STRUCTURES AND FRAGMENTED POLITICAL
COMMUNITIS
In the New Haven case study, Warren and Cohen note the various
occasions in which union leaders, who repeatedly sought community
support for their own organizing efforts, were visibly absent from
important community struggles. Most notably, the union was missing from
the broad-based community struggle against a plan to reroute a number of
bus stops in order to clear "the congestion" (of large numbers of minorities)
in front of the Omni Hotel. The union's failure to commit its attention and
65. See, e.g., Mutua, supra note 5, at 1198-99 (noting how, against all odds, Blacks
have long resisted their dehumanization despite the racial dictatorship of white supremacy).
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resources to non-union related community struggles undermined
community good will and the sustainability of the labor/community
coalitions that had proven so crucial to the union's earlier organizing
efforts. The union's absence from these community struggles made its
subsequent appeals to solidarity and claims of interdependence appear
opportunistic and self-serving. To its credit, union leaders recognized the
problem and took steps to address it by institutionalizing a community
liaison. However, even then, the union still failed to aggressively support
community opposition to the training program the OMNI instituted for
New Haven residents seeking employment at the hotel.
As Warren and Cohen acknowledge, this dynamic in the relationship
between labor unions and community organizations is not unique to New
Haven. Indeed, much of the authors' analysis situates this particular case
study within a broader theoretical framework that explains why this
dynamic occurs so regularly.66 Unions have often sought community
support for their picket lines and boycotts. However, they also have often
failed to support community struggles not directly related to union issues
and concerns. 67 Nevertheless, union failures to participate reciprocally in
community struggles over matters unrelated to the conditions of
employment must be analyzed against a history of judicial interpretation
that has worked to isolate unions and to narrow the instances in which
unionized workers can lawfully exercise economic and political power.6
Judicial precedents have imposed significant legal restrictions on
union power to conduct secondary boycotts and political strikes;69 they
have expanded the threat of antitrust liability in instances where labor
unions coordinate their concerted activities with non-labor groups;70 they
have imported and arbitrarily applied highly indeterminate obligations of
employee "loyalty" to employers;7 and they have substantially restricted
66. See Warren & Cohen, supra note 2, at 631-37 (noting for example, that unions have
access to more financial resources to implement their agendas, internal mechanisms of
accountability, and member discipline, which enables them to mobilize relatively more
effectively than community organizations lacking these financial and institutional
resources).
67. See SIMS, supra note 57, at 4-6; Feldman, supra note 46. See generally
ORGANIZING TO WIN, supra note 29.
68. See generally Melinda J. Branscomb, Labor, Loyalty, And The Corporate
Campaign, 73 B.U. L. REV. 291 (1993); Feldman, supra note 46; Fischl, supra note 46;
Jennifer Friesen, The Costs of 'Fee Speech' Restrictions on the Use of Union Dues to Fund
New Organizing, 15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 603 (1988); Seth Kupferberg, Political Strikes,
Labor Law, and Democratic Rights, 71 VA. L. REV. 685 (1985); James Gray Pope, Labor-
Community Coalitions and Boycotts: The Old Labor Law, the New Unionism and the Living
Constitution, 69 Thx. L. REv. 899 (1991).
69. See Feldman, supra note 46; Kupferberg, supra note 68; Pope, supra note 68.
70. See Pope, supra note 68.
71. See Branscomb, supra note 68.
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the use of union member dues to promote a broad political agenda and even
to organize unorganized sectors of the working class.72  Through the
articulation of these precedents, courts have been deeply implicated in the
emergence and consolidation of a narrow minded, apolitical, conformist
and isolated brand of unionism. The fact that some unions have,
nevertheless, taken the risk of engaging broader issues and of acting in
solidarity with non-labor groups is as unsurprising as the fact that many
mre have not.
As both the Greensboro and New Haven case studies powerfully
illustrate, there are always individuals whose personal power and moral
integrity compel them to transcend their context. However, the measure of
a legal regime's legitimacy is not the fact that justice can be achieved
through the agency of persons and communities whose courage,
commitment, and generosity impels them, on principle, to risk the
consequences of violating the norms and procedures that would otherwise
obstruct the achievement of justice. On the contrary, the fact that labor
unions in this country have so often, and so thoroughly, failed so many
workers and communities because, and precisely to the extent that they do
in fact, obey the law, indicates why such laws are unjust and must be
changed.
Conversely, just as judicial precedents restrict the extent of labor
union participation in broader community matters, they also restrict the
extent to which community organizations can meaningfully participate in
union struggles. Six years ago, I wrote extensively about the way potential
solidarities between the labor and civil rights movements had been
undermined by judicial interpretation of the doctrine of "exclusive
representation, 7 3 and, more generally, by the interpretative fragmentation
of Title VII and the NLRA.74 This analysis is directly relevant to the issues
raised by these two case studies. It reveals the underlying legal framework
through which the politics of fragmentation is formally institutionalized
and, therefore, sheds important light on the obstacles confronting Warren
and Cohen's objective of transforming the spontaneous ad hoc cooperation
that oftentimes characterizes labor/community collaborations into
72. See Friesen, supra note 68.
73. The doctrine of "exclusive representation" is defined by the body of judicial
precedents interpreting Section 9(a) of the NLRA, which provides in part that:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective
bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for
such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the
employees in such a unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in
respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions
of employment ....
29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1994).
74. See Structures of Subordination, supra note 12, at 404-67.
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institutionally sustainable coalitions.
As Warren and Cohen point out, creating sustainable labor/community
coalitions depends, in part, on increasing union accountability to the
various communities to which their members belong. For this to occur,
however, "civil rights and other community organizations must mobilize
their own base, particularly that of their membership who are also union
members."75 In other words, community organizations should seek access
to, and demand representation of community interests within the union's
internal governance structures and decision making procedures through the
agency of union members, whose intersectional identities and political
commitments make them authentic community representatives. Two brief
examples illustrate how the institutional structures established through
judicial interpretation currently obstruct this altogether reasonable
suggestion.
Increasing union accountability to communities, through the agency of
union members who also belong to broader community groups or civil
rights organizations, requires that union governance structures and decision
making procedures provide meaningful opportunities for these individuals
to exercise effective leadership within the union. Though progress has
been made in unions like HERE and UNITE, where women and minorities
constitute a relatively large percentage, if not a majority, of the union's
membership, the leadership of American unions is still disproportionately
male and white.76
Early efforts to diversify union leadership through affirmative action
programs ran afoul of the peculiar way in which courts interpreted the
relationship between Title VII, which prohibits employment-related
discrimination based on sex, race and other protected categories, and the
LMRDA, which was passed to ensure that internal union governance
operated democratically.77 Despite obvious connections between the
diversification of union leadership and the goal of fair and equal
representation for all the union's constituencies, courts reviewing the
legality of challenged affirmative action programs concluded that such
programs constituted unreasonable restrictions on the "freedom of
candidacy and voting," which the LMRDA was designed to ensure.
7
8
These LMRDA precedents constitute a distinct but no less severe
restriction on the use of affirmative action programs to diversify union
leadership than the restrictions imposed by more recent developments in
75. Warren & Cohen, supra note 2, at 654.
76. See, e.g., LABOR RESEARCH REvIEw 20 (Midwest Center for Labor Research ed.,
1993); LABOR RESEARCH REvIEw 11 (Midwest Center for Labor Research ed., 1988).
77. See Structures of Subordination, supra note 12, at 457-67.
78. Donovan v. Illinois Educ. Ass'n, 667 F.2d 638, 640-41 (7th Cir. 1982).
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the Supreme Court's unequal protection jurisprudence.79 This is because
the precedents striking down affirmative action programs under the
LMRDA are based in some instances on the asserted premise that "there is
no relationship between the [race or gender-based] eligibility qualifications
and duties of [holding a union office] 80 and in others, on the asserted
unreasonableness of any candidacy qualification that "excludes a majority
of the union's membership."8' Ironically, these precedents, articulated
through a discourse of colorblindness and the supposed imperatives of
participatory democracy, constitute major obstacles to diversification of
union leadership in precisely those unions that most need it. These are
unions in which members of racially subordinated communities constitute a
distinct and submerged minority, as well as non-responsive unions, whose
leadership is entrenched through racist or sexist block voting.82 To the
extent the future of labor/community solidarity depends on increased union
accountability to community interests and this increased accountability
depends on the effective representation of community interests within
unions, these LMRDA precedents constitute major obstacles to the
effective institutionalization of labor/community coalitions.
A second example of the way judicial interpretation has
institutionalized the fragmentation of labor/community coalitional
collaborations can be found in the way judicial precedents have construed
the doctrine of "exclusive representation" to preclude establishment of a tri-
partite system of arbitration and the use of third party intervention in union
grievance procedures. William Gould made this proposal shortly after
Title VII was first enacted. 4 Such a system might have encouraged civil
rights organizations and other organized social groups to develop a stronger
stake in the labor movement by establishing an institutional structure
through which these external organizations could have effectively
participated in the union decisions particularly affecting their members.
Through their standing to represent community members in union
grievance proceedings, civil rights and other community organizations
might have developed a formal presence in the labor movement and a stake
79. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (applying strict
scrutiny to all government race-based classifications).
80. Shultz v. Local 1291, Int'l Longshoremen's Assn., 338 F. Supp. 1204, 1206-07
(E.D. Pa. 1972).
81. Donovan, 667 F.2d at 642.
82. See Structures of Subordination, supra note 12, at 461-64 (deconstructing
underlying assumptions and criticizing the anti-democratic impact of these cases and the
disenfranchisement they re/produce for women of color and any other subordinated minority
group within the union).
83. See id. at 498-502.
84. See William B. Gould, Labor Arbitration of Grievances Involving Racial
Discrimination, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 40 (1969).
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in its institutions. At the same time, their participation in the union's
governance structures might have made the union's grievance processing
system a much more meaningful framework for resolving intergroup
conflicts between union members and for reconciling union interests and
community concerns. Instead, the doctrine of exclusive representation was
deployed to make grievance processing procedures, like collective
bargaining, the exclusive prerogative of union officials.85
By juxtaposing these two examples of the way judicial precedents
enable unions to monopolize institutional power by excluding women and
racial minorities from leadership positions and community organizations
from their governance structures to the other line of judicial precedents
restricting the capacity of labor unions to effectively participate in broader
community struggles, this analysis clearly demonstrates the extent to which
the politics of fragmentation currently dividing the labor movement from
other progressive social movements is an unsurprising real world
consequence of the ideology that has long informed judicial interpretation
across a wide range of doctrinal contexts. The cumulative impact of these
precedents is an institutional framework that substantially restricts the
opportunities for labor and community organizations to engage in
meaningful collaboration or to invest in each other's struggles. What is
needed, instead, are institutional arrangements that enable democratic
participation by labor and community coalitions in each other's institutions
and projects as well as in the economic decisions and political processes
that so directly affect the lived realities of workers and their communities.
In this vein, the New Haven case study provides some excellent
suggestions that merit further reflection and development.86 Warren and
Cohen clearly recognize that the problems confronting the project to
promote more effective labor/community coalitions have two dimensions.
The first dimension of the problem is reflected in the anti-democratic and
exclusionary structures of internal union governance. Any effort to
promote more effective labor/community coalitions must address this
problem by exploring alternative ways of designing the structures and
procedures of internal union governance. Rather than suppressing the
multidimensional identities and collective solidarities that connect
individual union members to a broader array of communities outside the
union, the objective here must be to design new union governance
structures that enable union members to effectively express their
perspectives and represent the interests of these broader communities
within the decision making processes of the union.
Effective participation, however, requires more than simply having the
85. See Structures of Subordination, supra note 12, at 499.
86. See Warren & Cohen, supra note 2, at 653-55.
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opportunity to express one's perspective; it also requires a reconfiguration
of decision making authority and institutional power within unions that
enables these alternative perspectives to have a meaningful impact on the
union's policies and agenda. In Structures of Subordination, I forwarded
such an alternative legal regime by examining three models for
institutionalizing anti-essentialist self-representational structures which
would more fully and fairly permit effective worker self-determination
based on a recognition, rather than a suppression, of the multidimensional
and intersectional nature of individual political identity.Y
The second dimension of the problem focuses on the obstacles
restricting union participation in broader community struggles. Efforts to
address this problem must necessarily target, and ultimately reform, the
legal doctrines that currently define the terms and conditions of union
participation in broader economic and political forums, struggles and
decision making processes outside the union. 8 Unions must have the legal
right to participate fully and effectively in defining the norms and
objectives that will govern the process of community development and
determine the terms and conditions of community life-both within and
beyond the workplace. Viewed from either perspective, the project to
promote effective labor/community coalitions will, as Warren and Cohen
note, require the institutionalization of new regimes.
To be sure, institutionalizing these new regimes will undoubtedly
depend on the extent to which the labor movement successfully overcomes
its prior history of racism, sexism, and business unionism, and invests more
aggressively in organizing the vast numbers of unorganized workers in all
sectors of the inter/national economy. s9 Absent substantial organizing
efforts, labor will simply never have the political power it needs to
effectuate any meaningful labor reform in this country.90 However, any
meaningful legal reform effected through legislative action is still
vulnerable to "deradicalization" so long as current judicial ideologies
dominate the future articulation of judicial interpretation. 9'
Against this backdrop, these two lines of judicial precedent and their
87. See Structures of Subordination, supra note 12, at 478-86 (comparing and assessing
relative advantages of three models for reforming majoritarian decision making procedures:
(1) interest group certification; (2) cumulative voting; and (3) separate representational
structures).
88. See, e.g., supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
89. For some hopeful accounts of recent organizing efforts, see generally ORGANZNG
TO WIN, supra note 29.
90. See id. at 7-8 (noting that low levels of unionization have led to loss of political
power); see also Margaret Weir, Wages and Jobs: What is the Public Role?, in SOCIAL
DIVIDE: POLImcAL PARTIEs AND THE FUTURE OF AcivsT GOVERNMENT 269-79 (Margaret
Weir ed., 1998) (recounting how labor's political weakness impacted the Clinton
Administration's calculations of political expediency).
91. See, e.g., Kare, Judicial Deradicalization, supra note 33.
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impact on the de-politicization and fragmentation of labor/community
coalitions also make evident the reasons why LatCrit scholars and activists
should seriously engage in and lend critical support to labor leaders and
community activists seeking new forms of labor/community solidarity.
Such efforts to bridge intergroup divisions are completely consistent with
the anti-essentialist, anti-subordination commitments of the LatCrit
movement. It is also consistent with LatCrit's steadfast emphasis on
articulating a theory and practice of authentic coalition building.
92
Involvement in these labor/community struggles makes it increasingly
apparent that "essentialism" is not just an ideology that fragments
communities and demobilizes collective action by suppressing the
expression of intersectional identities and multiple perspectives. It is also a
constitutive element of the institutional arrangements we inhabit-precisely
because these institutions have been re/produced through the deployment of
essentialist ideologies for the purpose of enforcing essentialist agendas.
Even more alarming, these institutions are the "built environments"
whose institutional patterns, practices, and customs may outlive the
deconstruction and demise of the essentialist ideologies that initially
produced them. This may happen because the real world consequences of
an ideology oftentimes take on a life of their own in the habitual practices
and uncritical reflex reactions of those who inhabit, but do not critically
examine the dynamics of, the built environments in which they are situated.
This is why combating essentialism means challenging both the ideological
discourses through which it is expressed and the social relations and
institutional arrangements that manifest it as a material force in the real
world. This is also why critical and self-critical theory, of the sort that
LatCrit scholars have striven to articulate, will continue to be of central
importance in the process of social transformation.
III. CONCLUSION
Though LatCrit theory was born of the need to challenge the
92. See, e.g., Robert S. Change & Keith Aoki, Centering the Immigrant in the
Inter/National Imagination, 85 CAL. L. REv. 1395 (1997); Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr.,
Latinos, Blacks, Others and the New Legal Narrative, 2 HARV. LAMTNO L. REv. 479 (1997);
Leslie Espinoza & Angela P. Harris, Afterword: Embracing the Tar-Baby--LatCrit Theory
and the Sticky Mess of Race, 85 CAL. L. REv. 1585 (1997); Iglesias & Valdes, supra note
64, at 562-88; Elizabeth M. Iglesias, The Intersubjectivty of Objective Justice: A Theory and
Praxis for Constructing LatCrit Coalitions, 2 HARv. LATINO L. REv. 467 (1997); Francisco
Valdes, Sex and Race in Queer Legal Culture: Ruminations on Identities &
Interconnectivities, 5 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STuD. 25 (1995); Eric K. Yamamoto,
Rethinking Alliances: Agency, Responsibility and Interracial Justice, 3 UCLA AsIAN PAc.
AM. L. J. 33 (1995).
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essentialist ideology of the Black/White paradigm,93 the anti-subordination
imperative that has been the driving force at the heart of this movement has
quickly pushed the substantive agenda of the LatCrit project beyond a
narrow agenda of identity politics focused exclusively on issues of
discrimination and equal protection. Instead, LatCrit scholars have
affirmatively sought to address a much broader array of matters of
universal concern to all peoples seeking spiritual, material, and cultural
liberation from the violence of subordination, marginalization, and
dispossession so pervasive in our societies. 94 It is therefore not surprising
that class has repeatedly emerged as a central concern among LatCrit
scholars.95 Indeed, the upcoming LatCrit V Annual Conference in May
2000 will be expressly devoted to issues of class.96 Moreover, class
subordination and its particular forms of manifestation in Latina/o
communities were also important themes in the scholarly works produced,
both at LatCrit l17 and LatCrit IV.9s
This record of LatCrit efforts to link identity politics to an anti-
essentialist, anti-poverty agenda that engages issues of class stratification
both within and between minority communities, gives witness to the ready
93. See Under Construction, supra note 3, at 17-20.
94. See, e.g., Foreword: LatCrit III, supra note 7, at 584 (reflecting on the significant
advances LatCrit scholars have made in linldng identity politics to a substantive analysis of
numerous issues oftentimes "cast as matters of universal concern, not particularly relevant to
Latina/o and other minority communities, whose primary focus of attention has been
thought to center on issues of discrimination and the meaning of equal protection" and
arguing that "LatCrit theory, by contrast, claims an interest in matters of universal concern,
precisely because it rejects the metaphysical and epistemological assumptions that underpin
the bifurcation of universal and particular").
95. See Iglesias & Valdes, supra note 64, at 574-82 (noting the significance of class in
Latina/o subordination and arguing that LatCrit anti-poverty agendas must take into account
the particularities of class-based subordination that affect different Latinalo communities in
different ways); Rachel F. Moran, Foreword-Demography and Distrust: The Latino
Challenge to Civil Rights and Immigration Policy in the 1990s and Beyond, 8 LA RAzA 1,
10 (1995) (noting that Latinas/os "often have been attuned to questions of class, rather than
race or ethnicity, in formulating a reform agenda").
96. See LatCrit V Conference Theme and Call for Papers, LatCrit Theory and Praxis in
a World of Economic Inequality, <airrP://NERSP.NERDc.tuFL.EDU/-MALAVET/LATcRrr/
LcVDOcs/PAPERs.HTM> (centering class in the articulation of LatCrit theory).
97. See, e.g., Corrada, supra note 47; Mary Romero, Immigration, the Servant Problem
and the Legacy of the Domestic Labor Debate: Where Can You Find Good Help These
Days!, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1045 (1999).
98. See, e.g., Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, The Rakes of Wrath: Urban
Agricultural Workers and the Struggle Against Los Angeles' Ban on Gas-Powered Leaf
Blowers, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. (forthcoming Spring 2000); Tanya K. Hernandez, An
Exploration of the Efficacy of Class-Based Approaches to Racial Justice: The Cuban
Context, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. (forthcoming Spring 2000); Pamela J. Smith, The Tyrannies
of Silence of the Untenured, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. (forthcoming Spring 2000); William R.
Tamayo, The Role of the EEOC in Protecting the Civil Rights of Farmworkers, 33 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. (forthcoming Spring 2000).
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synergies awaiting further cross-fertilization and collaboration between
LatCrit scholars, labor and community leaders, legal scholars, and social
scientists that have coalesced around the coalitional project embedded in
the New Haven and Greensboro case studies. Both projects center the
intersectional identities of minority workers in the transformation of
essentialist regimes. Both seek also to bridge lines of division between
progressive social movements and ultimately to produce a social reality
that gives genuine meaning to human "community."
Just as LatCrit theory cannot effectively evolve without genuine
involvement in the real world struggles of subordinated peoples, these
struggles may likewise fall short of the mark if they are isolated from the
critical perspectives that will enable them to see the broader context of their
struggles.99 For all these reasons, the project to promote labor/community
solidarity is a project worth LatCrit attention.
99. For further thoughts along this line, see Global Markets, Racial Spaces, supra note
17 (discussing reflections on the land-occupation struggles of the Peruvian poor and the
obstacles confronting the revolutionary aspirations of South African grassroots movements);
see also Foreword: LatCrit III, supra note 7, at 599-600 (arguing that the objective and
measure of anti-essentialist critical theory is articulating "a broader perspective from which
the particular experiences and various claims of different groups can be seen as part of a
common struggle for justice").
